We develop a structural model to investigate the effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts on dynamic principal-agent relationships. Optimism has a first-order effect on incentives, investments, and output, which could reconcile the private equity puzzle. Asymmetric beliefs cause optimal contracts to have features consistent with observed venture capital and research and development (R&D) contracts. We derive testable implications for the effects of project characteristics on contractual features. We calibrate our model to data on pharmaceutical R&D projects and show that optimism indeed significantly influ- 
Real-world principal-agent settings such as venture capital (VC) and research and development (R&D) are characterized by imperfect information and asymmetric beliefs about project payoffs (Malmendier and Tate 2005; Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler 2007; Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey 2008) . Further, long-term principal-agent relationships feature dynamic actions by both parties. For example, VC projects have salient features such as dynamic staging of the VC's investments, progressive vesting of the entrepreneur's stake, and the presence of intertemporal milestones or performance targets that must be met for the project to continue. Observed contracts also feature complex combinations of different types of financial securities with debt-and equity-like features as well as investment schedules that could increase over time, decrease over time, and sometimes vary nonmonotonically (e.g., Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi 2002; Kaplan and Stromberg 2003; Cochrane 2005) .
Motivated by the above evidence, we develop a dynamic principal-agent model that differs from previous models by incorporating three key features in a unified framework: (i) asymmetric beliefs and risk attitudes; (ii) dynamic actions by both parties; and (iii) endogenous termination of the relationship. We show how the intertemporal trade-off between the beneficial effects of agent optimism and the detrimental effects of the costs of risk-sharing affects the value generated by the principal-agent relationship and the characteristics of optimal dynamic contracts. The main contributions of our analysis are as follows.
1. We show that optimism has a first-order effect on incentives, investment, and output that could explain why venture capitalists and entrepreneurs invest in innovative ventures despite their high failure rates. 2. Consistent with observed contracts in environments such as VC and R&D, the optimal contracts predicted by our analysis feature (i) debt-and equitylike components; (ii) staged investment; (iii) investment schedules (increasing, decreasing, and nonmonotonic) that depend on the relative magnitudes of the agent's optimism and the costs of risk sharing; (iv) progressive vesting of the agent's stake; and (v) the presence of performance targets that must be met for the project to continue. In the benchmark scenario with symmetric beliefs, investments and incentive intensities increase over time.
The presence of asymmetric beliefs therefore plays a key role in generating the widely different paths of investments and incentives in observed contracts. 3. Our unified framework also generates new, potentially testable implications for the effects of underlying project characteristics on the time paths of investment and compensation. In contrast with traditional principal-agent models with symmetric beliefs in which risk negatively affects investment, we show that significant levels of optimism could lead to a positive relation between risk and investment. 4. We show that managerial optimism is, indeed, a key driver of R&D project values by calibrating our structural model to data on pharmaceutical R&D projects. Using the calibrated model, we demonstrate that permanent and transitory components of a project's risk have differing effects on its value and duration.
In our multiperiod framework, a cash-constrained, risk-averse agent with a project approaches a risk-neutral principal for financing. The project generates value through physical capital investments by the principal and effort by the agent. As in the study by Holmström and Milgrom (1987) , we model the project's contractible termination payoff or "outside value." The variance of the change in the termination payoff is the project's intrinsic risk, which is invariant through time. The expected change of the termination payoff has two components: a fixed component that represents the project's core output and a discretionary component that is affected by the principal's investment and the agent's effort. The principal and the agent have imperfect information about the project's core output and have differing priors. They "agree to disagree" about their respective mean assessments. The difference of their mean assessments is the degree of agent optimism.
The common variance of the principal's and the agent's assessments of the project's core output is its transient risk. The transient risk is resolved over time as intermediate observations of the project's termination payoff enable the players to update their assessments of the project's core output in a Bayesian manner. The principal chooses her dynamic investment policy, the agent's compensation, and the termination time to maximize her expected payoffs. The agent dynamically chooses his effort to maximize his expected utility.
We derive the incentive-efficient contracts between the principal and the agent. The optimal contracts predicted by our analysis have a number of features consistent with observed contracts in VC and R&D, the canonical environments in which our framework is applicable. They feature debt-and equity-like components, staged investment, progressive vesting of the agent's stake, and the presence of intertemporal milestones or performance targets to ensure continuation of the project.
We first derive "static" properties of the equilibrium contracts that hold in each period. In each period, the evolution of the agent's stake has a performancesensitive component that depends on the change in the project's termination payoff and a performance-invariant component that does not. The characteristics of optimal contracts-the principal's investments, the agent's compensation and effort, and the termination time-are determined by the agent's payperformance sensitivities, that is, the sensitivities of the change in the agent's stake in each period to the change in the termination payoff. Conditional on the project's continuation, the agent's pay-performance sensitivities and effort as well as the principal's investments are deterministic functions of time. The performance-invariant component of the change in the agent's stake in each period is, however, stochastic. It depends on the project's termination payoff history through its effect on the principal's and agent's updated assessments of the project's core output.
In any period, the agent's pay-performance sensitivity increases with the degree of agent optimism and declines with the price of risk (the product of the agent's risk aversion and the project's total risk). When the agent is optimistic, he overvalues the expected change in the project's termination payoff relative to the principal. The principal exploits the agent's optimism by increasing the performance-sensitive component of the agent's compensation relative to the performance-invariant component. The agent's pay-performance sensitivity therefore increases with his optimism even though optimism does not directly affect the agent's effort. In dynamic principal-agent models with symmetric beliefs (e.g., Holmström and Milgrom 1987; Gibbons and Murphy 1992) , incentives are affected by only the risk of the project. Because the principal and agent have differing expectations of the project's core output, their beliefs have a first-order effect on incentives even though neither party directly affects the project's core output.
The effects of the agent's optimism and the price of risk on the principal's investment and the agent's effort depend on their relative magnitudes. If the degree of agent optimism is less than the price of risk, the principal's investment and the agent's effort increase (decrease) with the degree of agent optimism (price of risk). If the degree of agent optimism exceeds the price of risk, however, the principal's investment decreases (increases) with the degree of agent optimism (price of risk), while the agent's effort varies nonmonotonically.
In traditional principal-agent models with symmetric beliefs, the negative effects of the costs of risk sharing arising from the agent's risk aversion always lead to underinvestment of effort relative to the first best scenario in which the principal and agent are risk neutral. In our framework, however, optimism significantly mitigates the detrimental effects of the costs of risk sharing. In fact, if the degree of agent optimism is sufficiently high, it could even cause the agent to overinvest effort relative to the benchmark scenario with symmetric beliefs and universal risk-neutrality. Further, the principal finds it beneficial to exploit agent optimism by significantly increasing her investments in projects relative to the scenario in which beliefs are symmetric. The firstorder effect of optimism on investment explains why venture capitalists and entrepreneurs continue to invest in innovative ventures despite their high failure rates.
A body of literature modifies the traditional principal-agent model by introducing nonpecuniary private benefits to explain such investments. Recent evidence, however, shows that these private benefits must be implausibly high relative to typical entrepreneurial incomes to justify observed investment levels, which leads to a "private equity puzzle" (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002) . Our analysis shows that the presence of entrepreneurial optimism, and its rational exploitation by venture capitalists, potentially reconciles the private equity puzzle. Importantly, the beneficial effects of optimism survive without exogenously restricting the set of permissible contracts.
The dynamics of equilibrium contracts are influenced by the principal and agent rationally updating their assessments of the project's core output over time. The passage of time causes transient risk to be resolved, thereby lowering the price of risk. However, the passage of time also lowers the degree of agent optimism (and, therefore, the rents the principal can extract) as the agent revises his assessments of core output. The process of Bayesian learning leads to different equilibrium dynamics depending on the relative rates of decline of the degree of agent optimism and the price of risk.
If the initial degree of agent optimism is below a threshold relative to the price of risk (the agent is "moderately optimistic"), the beneficial effect of time on the costs of risk sharing dominates its negative effect on the degree of agent optimism. Hence, the agent's pay-performance sensitivity and effort as well as the principal's investments increase over time. If the initial degree of agent optimism is above a threshold relative to the price of risk (the agent is "exuberant"), the negative effect of time on the agent's optimism dominates. The agent's pay-performance sensitivity, therefore, declines over time. Because the agent is initially exuberant, the degree of agent optimism exceeds the price of risk in early periods. In these periods, the principal's investments increase, while the agent's effort varies nonmonotonically. In later periods, when the degree of agent optimism falls below the price of risk, investment and effort both decline over time. Therefore, depending on the level of agent optimism, his compensation could become more or less sensitive to performance over time, while the principal's investment path could increase, decrease, or even vary nonmonotonically. In the benchmark scenario with symmetric beliefs, the principal's investments, the agent's pay-performance sensitivity, and his effort increase over time. In reality, however, VC and R&D projects feature investment schedules that could be increasing, decreasing, or nonmonotonic over time (e.g., Grabowski et al. 2002; Cochrane 2005) . Our analysis shows that the presence of asymmetric beliefs plays a central role in generating different time paths of investments and incentives.
Our results directly lead to potentially testable implications for how changes in agent optimism or the price of risk affect contractual dynamics that we describe in detail in Section 4. The effects of the agent's optimism and the price of risk on investment and compensation paths depend on whether the agent is moderately optimistic or exuberant. In particular, we show that the presence of optimism could lead to a positive relation between risk and investment, which sharply contrasts with traditional principal-agent models with symmetric beliefs in which risk negatively affects investment.
We complement prior literature in behavioral corporate finance by developing a fully specified structural model that can be calibrated to data. As an illustrative application of the model, we apply it to an R&D setting. The "principal" represents the shareholders of a firm and the "agent" represents the R&D manager who controls and executes R&D activities. We calibrate the model to data on the distributions of investments and returns for a sample of pharmaceutical R&D projects reported in Grabowski et al. (2002) . In addition to the other parameters, we calibrate the shareholders' mean assessment of the core output of an R&D project, the manager's mean assessment, as well as the true mean core output. Our calibration shows that the average R&D manager is significantly optimistic about the value of an R&D project in absolute terms as well as relative to shareholders, whereas shareholders are actually pessimistic in absolute terms. Consistent with the intuition gleaned from our theoretical
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The numerical analysis of the calibrated model leads to additional testable implications that link a project's transient and intrinsic risks to its value and duration. Transient risk potentially has conflicting effects on the project's value and duration. The variance of the evolution of the shareholders' and manager's mean assessments of core output increases with the initial transient risk because intermediate signals about core output are relatively more informative (the "signal to noise" ratio increases). As a result, the real option value of continuing the relationship increases, which positively affects the project's value and duration. An increase in transient risk, however, also increases the costs of risk sharing. In the calibrated model, the positive effect dominates so that the project's value and duration increase with the initial transient risk. An increase in the project's intrinsic risk lowers the variance of the evolution of the mean assessments of core output and also increases the costs of risk sharing. Consequently, the project's value and duration decline with intrinsic risk. Our results, therefore, imply that permanent and transitory components of the risks of projects have differing effects on their values and durations.
1
The positive effect of transient risk on project value sharply differs from the predictions of traditional principal-agent models with symmetric beliefs and exogenous termination in which an increase in uncertainty unambiguously has a negative effect on project value because costs of risk sharing increase. As the intuition above shows, the interactive effects of asymmetric beliefs and endogenous termination cause transient risk to positively affect value.
In a dynamic principal-agent model with symmetric beliefs, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show that the agent's compensation becomes more sensitive to performance over time. We show that the presence of asymmetric beliefs significantly alters the dynamics of compensation. The agent's compensation becomes more or less sensitive to performance over time depending on whether he is moderately optimistic or exuberant. Furthermore, depending on the level of agent optimism, the principal's investment policy could become more aggressive over time or less aggressive over time or vary nonmonotonically. Landier and Thesmar (2009) analyze the effects of optimism in a twoperiod model in which the principal and agent are risk neutral and the contractual space is exogenously restricted to debt contracts. They show that optimistic entrepreneurs are more likely to choose short-term debt. Adrian and Westerfield (2009) analyze a continuous-time principal-agent model with heterogeneous beliefs. They demonstrate that the interaction between incentive provision and learning creates an intertemporal source of "disagreement risk" that alters optimal risk sharing. We complement their study in several respects. First, both the principal and the agent take productive actions in our model. We derive new implications for the effects of heterogeneous beliefs, agency conflicts, and project characteristics on the principal's dynamic investment policy and the agent's compensation. Second, both the principal and the agent rationally update their assessments of the project's core output in a Bayesian manner. Third, the equilibrium termination time of the project in our model is a stopping time, which leads to predictions for the effects of the project's intrinsic/transient risks, and the degree of agent optimism on the duration and value of the project. Fourth, we calibrate our structural model and obtain quantitative insights into the level and effects of optimism.
Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2007) develop a two-period principal-agent model and show that managerial overconfidence can increase firm value. Our focus is on the effects of optimism, rather than overconfidence, in a dynamic principal-agent setting. A different stream of the literature examines the effects of asymmetric beliefs on financial intermediation. Allen and Gale (1999) analyze a two-period binomial model with asymmetric beliefs and show that financial markets perform better than intermediaries in the financing of new technologies when there is significant diversity of opinion among investors. Coval and Thakor (2005) show that financial intermediaries arise endogenously when entrepreneurs are optimistic relative to investors.
The plan for the article is as follows. In Section 1, we develop a static, singleperiod model to illustrate the intuition underlying the effects of optimism on incentives. We present the dynamic model in Section 2. We derive the equilibrium and its properties in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5, we present the calibration of the model and its numerical analysis. Section 6 concludes. We provide all supplementary material in Appendixes A, B, and C.
A Single-Period Model
We begin our investigation of the effects of asymmetric beliefs on principalagent relationships in a static, single-period model. The properties of the equilibrium in the dynamic model that we analyze in subsequent sections depend on those of the equilibrium in the static model.
(1)
Discretionary output is the portion of the project's incremental payoff, V 1 − V 0 , that depends on the principal's physical capital and the agent's human capital (effort) investments, and is represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Base output represents the portion of the payoff that is independent of the principal's and agent's actions. The first component of the base output, , represents the project's core output. The principal and agent have imperfect information about and could also differ in their beliefs about its value. The principal's and agent's respective priors on are normally distributed with
The agent is initially more optimistic than the principal; however, we do not make any assumptions about how the agent's and principal's mean assessments of core output relate to its true mean. The principal's and agent's respective beliefs are common knowledge, that is, they agree to disagree.
3 This assumption is supported by theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence. Morris (1995) argues that there is nothing in Bayesian decision theory or standard theories of rationality that requires agents to have the same priors. Allen and Gale (1999) discuss the long tradition in economics of allowing for differences in prior beliefs. In fact, the requirement that agents have a common prior can lead to counterfactual predictions, such as the impossibility of trade in common value assets. Kandel and Pearson (1995) provide evidence that trading around earnings announcements is due to differences in priors. The common prior assumption is especially questionable in new industries and technologies. As discussed by Allen and Gale, casual empiricism suggests that there is a wide variation in views on the effectiveness and value of an innovation immediately after the innovation has occurred. Since data based on actual experience with new products or technologies are nonexistent or small, there is diversity of opinion and people agree to disagree.
The second component of the base output, l 0 , represents "operating costs," which could include wages to salaried employees, depreciation expenses, decline in revenues due to competition, fixed costs arising from increases in the scale of the project, etc. These costs are deterministic.
3 While the principal and agent disagree on the mean of the project's core output, they agree on its variance, σ 2 0 . The behavioral economics literature (Baker et al. 2007 ) distinguishes between optimism and overconfidence. An agent is "optimistic" if his assessment of the mean (the first moment) of the distribution is higher than that of the principal, while he is "overconfident" if his assessment of the variance (the second moment) of the distribution is lower than that of the principal. The agent is, therefore, optimistic but not overconfident in our framework.
The third component of the base output, S 1 , is a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance s 2 . The random variable S 1 represents the project's intrinsic risk, which is the uncertainty in the project's payoff from the perspective of a hypothetical "omniscient" agent who knows the project's true core output .
Principal-agent contracting
The risk-neutral principal offers the agent a contract that specifies the agent's payoff at date 1, P 1 ; the principal's capital investment, c 0 ; and the agent's effort, η 0 . The agent is risk averse with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) preferences. His total expected utility (including disutility of effort) is
where the superscript on the expectation denotes that it is with respect to the agent's beliefs. The allocation of bargaining power between the principal and the agent is determined by the "certainty equivalent" reservation utility or promised payoff, P 0 , that the agent must be guaranteed to participate in the contract. We consider all possible allocations of bargaining power between the principal and the agent that are indexed by different values of P 0 . A contract is feasible if and only if it is incentive compatible for the agent to exert the specified effort, η 0 , i.e.,
and the contract meets the agent's participation constraint at date zero, i.e.,
As we discuss later in Section 3, it suffices to restrict consideration to affine contracts in which the agent's promised payoff at date 1 satisfies
In Equation (6), a 0 determines the performance-invariant or "cash" component of the agent's compensation, while b 0 (V 1 − V 0 ) determines the performancesensitive component. We refer to the parameter b 0 as the agent's payperformance sensitivity.
Remark 1. The agent's compensation can be rewritten as P 1 = (P 0 + a 0 − b 0 V 0 ) + b 0 V 1 , which implies that the agent's contract can be implemented through a cash payment, P 0 + a 0 − b 0 V 0 , plus an equity stake, b 0 . As we will see shortly, the static model actually represents a single period in our dynamic model in which all payoffs occur at the termination time. Unlike the static model, the agent's compensation contract cannot be implemented through a simple equity stake, so that the pay-performance sensitivity should not be interpreted as an equity share (see Remark 3).
The optimal contract
We assume the following condition on the parameters α, β, and γ for the remainder of the article:
This condition implies that (i) the agent faces decreasing returns to scale from the provision of effort; and (ii) the agent's disutility from effort is sufficiently pronounced relative to its positive contribution to output so that an optimal contract between the principal and the agent exists.
Fix the agent's contractual parameters a 0 , b 0 , and the principal's investment c 0 . A feasible contract must satisfy the incentive compatibility condition (4). Substituting Equations (6) and (1) into Equation (4), and using the fact that
under the agent's beliefs,
Assumption 1 guarantees that a unique solution to Equation (7) exists. We conclude that the effort level specified by the contract is incentive compatible for the agent if and only if
The arguments of the agent's effort indicate its dependence on the payperformance sensitivity b 0 and the principal's investment c 0 . (The effort does not depend on the contractual parameter a 0 .) We henceforth refer to η(·, ·) as the agent's optimal effort function. A feasible contract must also satisfy the agent's participation constraint (5). The principal chooses the contract so that the agent's participation or "promise keeping" constraint is satisfied at equality. Consequently, the contractual parameter a 0 can be expressed in terms of the contractual parameters b 0 and c 0 via the identity
We henceforth refer to a 0 (·, ·) as the agent's performance-invariant compensation function.
The principal is risk neutral. She chooses the contractual parameters b 0 and c 0 to maximize her expected payoff. Because V 0 and P 0 are fixed, the contractual parameters maximize the principal's expected incremental payoff, which is the expected change in her stake (V 1 − P 1 ) − (V 0 − P 0 ) less her investment c 0 . The expectation is under the principal's beliefs. 4 Fix contractual parameters b 0 and c 0 . The risk-neutral principal's expected incremental payoff is
Substituting the agent's effort (8) into Equation (10) and using the fact that
the principal's expected incremental payoff simplifies to
In Equation (11),
represents the degree of agent optimism,
represents the price of risk, and
The principal's capital investment and the agent's pay-performance sensitivity maximize the principal's expected incremental payoff (11). Fix the pay-performance sensitivity b 0 . As we show later, the optimal investment is zero whenever b 0 ≥ γ/β, which occurs if the degree of agent optimism 0 is sufficiently high. We impose an upper bound on 0 that guarantees that the investment is positive if the project continues. (The precise upper bound is specified later in Assumption 2.) Then fix a value of b 0 ∈ (0, γ/β). Assumption 1 guarantees that the function (b 0 , ·) is strictly concave in the investment c 0 (the exponent on c 0 is guaranteed to be less than 1). Setting the partial derivative of (b 0 , ·) with respect to c 0 equal to zero yields
We refer to c(·) as the optimal investment function. As a function of the payperformance sensitivity b 0 , the principal's expected incremental payoff can now be expressed as 
The optimal contract is completely specified by b * 0 : the optimal investment c * 
The optimal investment function
It follows directly from Equations (16) and (17) that the properties of the optimal contract critically depend on the properties of the optimal investment function c(·). The next proposition establishes properties of this function that play a key role in our subsequent analysis. The proof of this result and all subsequent ones are in Appendix A. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the optimal investment function. The intuition for the nonmonotonicity of the function is that an increase in the agent's pay-performance sensitivity affects the principal's investment in two distinct but opposite ways. On the positive side, the agent increases his effort. Because investment and effort are complementary, the increase in the agent's effort provides an incentive for the principal to increase her investment. On the negative side, since the agent's disutility of effort increases, the principal's cost to maintain the agent's participation also increases. For lower values of the pay-performance sensitivity, the complementarity of investment and effort causes the benefits of increased output to dominate. Hence, the principal finds it beneficial to increase her investment. However, beyond a threshold level of pay-performance sensitivity, the costs of inducing high effort from the agent are so high that the principal lowers her investment. In other words, it is optimal for the principal to allow output to be dominated by the agent's effort.
The principal's periodic flow function
By Equation (17), the properties of the optimal contract depend on the properties of the principal's periodic flow function that is defined as follows:
It consists of three components: the economic rent from the agent's optimism, which the principal extracts from the agent by exploiting his optimism about the project's core output (we elaborate on this later); the costs of risk sharing, between the risk-neutral principal and the risk-averse agent; and the return on investment, which reflects the principal's expected return as a result of her investment and the agent's effort. By Equation (17) When the agent is optimistic, he overvalues the project's expected payoff relative to the principal. To exploit the agent's optimism, the principal increases the performance-sensitive component of the agent's compensation (because the agent overvalues this component) and decreases the performance-invariant or cash component. As the degree of agent optimism increases, the extent to which the agent overvalues the project's payoff increases, which implies his pay-performance sensitivity increases. Note that the agent's pay-performance sensitivity increases with the degree of agent optimism even though optimism does not directly affect the agent's effort.
As long as the degree of agent optimism is less than the price of risk, the agent's effort increases with the degree of optimism because his payperformance sensitivity increases. The agent's optimism, therefore, indirectly affects his effort through the sensitivity of his contractual compensation to the project's payoff. Because investment and effort are complementary, the principal also increases her investment as the agent's optimism increases.
If the degree of agent optimism exceeds the price of risk, however, the agent's pay-performance sensitivity exceeds one. In this region, it follows from the intuition for the nonmonotonicity of the optimal investment function c(·) (see the discussion following Proposition 1.1) that it is too costly for the principal to encourage the agent to exert high effort by increasing her investment. In other words, when the agent's optimism is above a threshold, it is optimal for the principal to allow the project's output to be dominated by the agent's effort relative to her investment. The principal's investment, therefore, declines with the degree of agent optimism in this region. The increase in the agent's pay-performance sensitivity with optimism has a positive effect on his effort, while the decline in the principal's investment has a negative effect. The interaction between these opposing effects causes the agent's effort to vary nonmonotonically in general.
The first-order effect of the agent's optimism on optimal incentives sharply differs from the predictions of traditional principal-agent models such as Holmström and Milgrom's (1987) in which incentives are affected by only the risk of the project. The fact that the principal and agent have differing expectations of the project's core output causes incentives to depend on their beliefs even though neither the principal nor the agent directly affects the project's core output.
Our results and the intuition underlying them imply that optimism could significantly mitigate the detrimental effects of the costs of risk sharing. In fact, if the degree of agent optimism is sufficiently high, it could even cause the agent to overinvest effort relative to the benchmark scenario with symmetric beliefs and universal risk-neutrality. Further, the principal finds it beneficial to exploit this optimism. In contrast, in traditional principal-agent models with symmetric beliefs, the negative effects of the costs of risk sharing arising from the agent's risk aversion always lead to underinvestment of effort relative to the first best scenario in which the principal and agent are risk neutral. The first-order effect of optimism on investment accords well with evidence that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs continue to invest in highly innovative ventures even though the chances of failure are extremely high.
Proposition 1.4 (Effects of Risk on Optimal Contract).
Risk has the following effects on the optimal contractual parameters. (The proof of this proposition is omitted, since it mirrors the proof for Proposition 1.3.)
An increase in the price of risk increases the costs of risk sharing between the principal and the agent, which lowers the "power of incentives" that can be provided to the risk-averse agent as measured by his pay-performance sensitivity. The nonmonotonic variation of the principal's optimal investment with the agent's pay-performance sensitivity, however, implies that the price of risk does not always have a negative effect on the principal's investment. When the degree of agent optimism is less than the price of risk, investment and effort decline with the price of risk. When the degree of agent optimism is greater than the price of risk, investment increases with the price of risk and the agent's effort varies nonmonotonically. The presence of significant optimism could, therefore, lead to a positive relation between risk and investment.
Remark 2. The pay-performance sensitivity could exceed one when the principal is significantly pessimistic relative to the agent and therefore requires additional insurance (or "collateral") against low project realizations to be induced to invest in the project (see Propositions 1.3 and 1.4). The standard empirical proxy for the pay-performance sensitivity is the total "delta" of the agent's stake (see Core, Guay, and Larcker 2003) , and it could be close to one or even exceed it. For example, bank debt financing is common for small startup firms. The "principal" holds a pure debt contract. Because the agent holds all the equity, the delta of his stake either equals one (if the debt is risk free) or could be close to one. Further, in private debt financing, the agent is often required to post additional assets as collateral that could be seized by the principal in the event of default. One possible implementation of such a financing arrangement is for the principal to hold debt plus a security that provides insurance against bad states such as a put option. In addition to equity, the agent is therefore short a put option. Since a put option has a negative delta, the total "delta" of the agent's stake exceeds one. As we further discuss in Remark 3, however, we again emphasize that the agent's pay-performance sensitivity in each period in the dynamic model should not be interpreted as an equity stake.
The Dynamic Model
The dynamic model is a multiperiod extension of the static model. It introduces new economic forces that are absent in the static setting, namely, the effects of long-term contracting and learning. The principal and agent can update their assessments of the project's core output based on intermediate signals. The process of Bayesian learning leads to different equilibrium dynamics depending on the relative magnitudes of the degree of agent optimism and the costs of risk sharing between the principal and the agent, both of which decline over time (though at different rates). Furthermore, the contractual relationship could be terminated at an intermediate random date based on posterior assessments of the project's quality.
We consider a finite horizon framework with equally spaced dates 0, 1, 2, . . . , T . As in the single-period model, the principal provides an initial seed capital V 0 at date zero. She offers the agent a long-term contract that describes her subsequent investments in the project, the agent's compensation, and the termination date of the project. Investments are made at the beginning of each period. The termination date could, in general, be contingent on the project's history.
The termination payoff process
The key state variable in the model is the project's termination payoff V i , which is the total payoff if the project is terminated at date i. The termination payoff process is contractible.
5 For simplicity, we assume that there are no intermediate cash flows, so that all payoffs occur upon termination.
The initial termination payoff of the project equals the seed capital investment V 0 . As in the static model, the incremental termination payoff or the change in the termination payoff over period [i, i + 1], V i+1 − V i , is the sum of the base output, a stochastic component that is unaffected by the actions of the principal and agent, and the discretionary output, a deterministic component that depends on the physical capital investment by the principal and the human capital investment (effort) by the agent. It is given by
As in the static model, represents the project's core output. The principal and agent have imperfect information about . Their respective initial priors on are described exactly as in Equation (2) of the static model and are common knowledge. The l i represents "operating costs," which are deterministic. The third component of the base output, S i+1 , is a random variable that represents the "intrinsic" component of the project's risk in period [i, i + 1]. The variables, {S i+1 }, are i.i.d. normal random variables with mean 0 and variance s 2 that are independent of . We refer to the parameter s as the project's intrinsic risk.
The discretionary output is observable to the principal and the agent. However, as in the literature on incomplete contracting, the discretionary output is nonverifiable and, therefore, noncontractible. Consequently, the agent's contract can be explicitly contingent only on the termination payoff process.
Define the random variable,
The termination payoff is the value of the project "outside the principal-agent relationship," that is, it is the present value of the project's future earnings from the perspective of "outside" investors at date i. As in studies such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , the principal and agent possess project-specific skills that are not transferable, so that the termination payoff (the "outside" value) is, in general, lower than its "inside" value. We can alter the model so that the principal and agent observe only unbiased "noisy" signals of the project's termination payoff. It follows from well-known formulas (DeGroot 1970 ) that the posterior distribution on for each date
, and that σ i tends to zero as i → ∞. We refer to the parameter σ i as the project's transient risk.
Define
We henceforth refer to i as the degree of agent optimism at date i. It follows from Equation (23) that the degree of agent optimism declines deterministically over time as the principal and agent update their priors on in a Bayesian manner based on observations of the termination payoff process.
Principal-agent contracting
The contract describes the principal's incremental capital investments over time, the agent's effort, and the payoffs to be received by both parties upon termination. Let {F i } denote the information filtration generated by the history of termination payoffs, the principal's investments, and the project's discretionary outputs. A feasible contract is described by the quadruple (P τ , c, η, τ), where c and η are {F i }-adapted stochastic processes, τ is an {F i }-stopping time, and P τ is a nonnegative {F τ }-measurable random variable. P τ is the agent's contractually promised payoff and V τ − P τ is the principal's payoff at the termination time τ of the contractual relationship. c i is the principal's investment and η i is the agent's effort in period [i, i + 1]. The termination time τ is, in general, a stopping time that is contingent on the project's performance history. The contract must be incentive compatible for the agent. That is, given the termination date τ, the agent's contractually promised payoff P τ , and the principal's investments c, it is optimal for the agent to choose the effort levels η specified by the contract.
The principal is risk neutral, while the agent is risk averse with intertemporal CARA preferences. The principal and the agent have a common time discount rate that we normalize to zero in our theoretical analysis to simplify notation. The agent's expected utility at date zero from a contract (P τ , c, η, τ) is
In Equation (24), E Ag 0 denotes the expectation with respect to the agent's beliefs at time 0. We define the agent's certainty equivalent expected future utility, P i , from the contract at any date i as
where the notation E Ag i denotes the agent's expectation conditioned on the information available at date i, that is, the σ-field F i . The agent's certainty equivalent future expected utility at the contractual termination date τ is his contractually promised terminal payoff P τ . We refer to the agent's certainty equivalent expected future utility {P i , i ≥ 0} as his promised payoff .
We define the agent's continuation utility ratio at date i, CUR(i), as the ratio of his expected utility from continuing the relationship to his utility if the relationship were terminated at date i and he received his promised payoff P i . Since the agent has a negative exponential utility function, the continuation utility ratio is
It follows from the definition of the agent's promised payoff process in Equation (25) that the agent's continuation utility ratio as defined above must be equal to one at all dates and states. In other words, the promise keeping constraint must be satisfied in each state of nature, that is, the contractually promised payoff of the agent must actually be delivered by the contract.
As in the static model, we consider all possible allocations of bargaining power between the principal and the agent that are indexed by different values of the agent's initial promised payoff P 0 . A contract (P τ , c, η, τ) is feasible if and only if it is incentive compatible for the agent and meets his participation constraint at date zero. The risk-neutral principal's optimal contract choice is a feasible contract that maximizes her expected payoff net of her investments. More precisely, a contract (P τ , c, η, τ) is optimal if and only if it solves the optimization problem
where E Pr 0 denotes the expectation with respect to the principal's beliefs at time 0 and the maximization is over all feasible contracts.
Dynamic Equilibrium
By Equation (24), the agent has multiplicatively separable CARA preferences and the termination payoff evolves as a Gaussian process as in the studies by Holmström and Milgrom (1987) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) . Following Gibbons and Murphy, therefore, we restrict consideration to contracts in which the agent's promised payoff process has the affine form
In Equation (28), the contractual parameters a i , b i are {F i } measurable. 6 It follows easily from Equation (28) that the agent's contractual payoff P τ at the termination date τ is
As discussed in Section 2.2, the agent's initial promised payoff P 0 determines the allocation of bargaining power between the principal and the agent. Extending the interpretation of the contractual parameters in the static model, the parameter a i is the "performance invariant" component of the agent's incremental promised payoff, while b i is the agent's pay-performance sensitivity in period [i, i + 1]. A feasible contract is characterized by P 0 , a, b, c, η, and τ, where P 0 is the agent's initial promised payoff, a, b determine the evolution of the agent's promised payoff (see Equation (28)), c is the principal's investment process, η is the agent's effort process, and τ is the termination date. The dynamic equilibrium is a "periodic" repetition of the equilibrium of the static model but incorporates the fact that the principal's and agent's posterior assessments of the project's core output, , evolve over time due to Bayesian learning as described in Equations (21) (8), (9), and (18) in the static model, define the agent's optimal effort function,
the agent's performance-invariant compensation function at date i,
and the principal's periodic flow function at date i, 
The termination time of the contract solves the following optimal stopping problem:
where the maximization is overall {F i }-stopping times τ ≤ T .
The optimal contractual parameters, (a * 
Dynamic properties
The dynamic properties of the equilibrium arise from the fact that the principal's and agent's posterior assessments of the project's core output evolve over time due to Bayesian learning. Let
denote the principal's periodic flow function in the benchmark scenario in which there is perfect information about the project's core output, that is, when σ i = 0 and i = 0. Let (b * p , c * p , η * p ) denote the optimal pay-performance sensitivity, investment, and effort in this benchmark scenario. Using Equations (21) and (23), the principal's period flow function at date i can be expressed as
Since σ i → 0 as i −→ ∞, it follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that
by continuity. We now characterize the dynamics of these economic variables. of risk sharing. However, the passage of time also lowers the degree of agent optimism and, therefore, the rents that the principal can extract by exploiting the agent's optimism. The time paths of the agent's pay-performance sensitivity, the principal's investment, and the agent's effort depend on the relative rates of decline of the rents from the agent's optimism and the costs of risk sharing.
If the agent is moderately optimistic, then the beneficial effect of time on the costs of risk sharing dominates its negative effect on the degree of agent optimism. Hence, the agent's pay-performance sensitivity and effort both increase over time. Because investment and effort are complementary, and the degree of agent optimism is low relative to the price of risk, the principal's investments also increase over time (see Sections 1.6 and 4.1).
If the agent is exuberant, the negative effect of the evolution of time on the degree of agent optimism dominates its positive effect on the costs of risk sharing. The agent's pay-performance sensitivity, therefore, declines over time. The dynamics of effort and investment are more complicated due to the nonmonotonicity of the optimal investment function (see Proposition 1.1 and Figure 1 ). If the degree of agent optimism is lower than the price of risk in each period, the agent's pay-performance sensitivity is less than one. The intuition underlying the static properties of the contract (see Sections 1.6 and 4.1) implies that the agent's effort and the principal's investment decline over time. If the initial degree of agent optimism is high enough, however, the degree of agent optimism exceeds the price of risk in early periods so that the agent's pay-performance sensitivity is greater than one. In these periods, the intuition underlying the static properties of the contract implies that the principal's investment increases, while the agent's effort varies nonmonotonically. In later periods when the degree of agent optimism falls below the price of risk, investment and effort both decline over time.
At the threshold level of the initial degree of the agent's optimism (which separates the two regions described above), the positive effects of the resolution of transient risk and the negative effects of the decline in the agent's optimism balance each other exactly so that pay-performance sensitivity, investment, and effort are constant over time. In the benchmark scenarios in which either there is no uncertainty about the project's core output (as in Holmström and Milgrom 1987) or there is uncertainty, but beliefs are symmetric, Theorem 4.1 implies that the principal's investments and the agent's pay-performance sensitivity and his effort are either constant or increase over time. In reality, however, VC and R&D projects feature investment schedules that could be increasing, decreasing, or nonmonotonic over time (e.g., see Cochrane 2005) . Our results show that the presence of asymmetric beliefs plays a central role in generating different time paths of investments and incentives.
In traditional dynamic principal-agent models such as Holmström and Milgrom (1987) , the optimal contract can be implemented through a simple combination of equity and zero-coupon debt. The varying dynamics of optimal contracts predicted by Theorem 4.1 imply that in the presence of asymmetric beliefs, optimal contracts can be implemented only through combinations of several financial securities, which is consistent with evidence that VC contracts feature complex combinations of various financial securities (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003) .
Remark 3. As shown in Theorem 4.1, the pay-performance sensitivities could exceed one if the agent is initially exuberant. Keep in mind, however, that all payoffs occur at the termination time τ. By Equation (29), the agent's final payoff as a proportion of the project's total payoff is
Because the a i are stochastic and the b i vary over time, the agent's compensation cannot simply be expressed as a combination of cash and an equity stake as in the static model. In other words, the pay-performance sensitivities should not be interpreted as equity stakes. The pay-performance sensitivity exceeds one only for periods i ≤ i * := ( 0 − p 0 )/λσ 2 0 . When the value of σ 0 is high relative to 0 , as might be expected for highly innovative projects, the value of i * is low. Consequently, an agent's initial exuberance dissipates quickly. Agent exuberance is likely to be economically relevant in the early stages of ventures. Given the paucity of detailed data on contracts in early stage ventures- Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) include only descriptive data on types of financial securities used in VC contracts but not their precise composition-we allow for the possibility of agent exuberance in early periods because the implications could be empirically relevant when detailed data become available. 
Sensitivity of equilibrium dynamics
We now investigate how the equilibrium dynamics vary with the degree of agent optimism 0 , the agent's risk aversion λ, the project's initial transient risk σ 0 , and the intrinsic risk s. The agent's pay-performance sensitivity, b * i , in any period [i, i + 1] declines with his risk aversion, the initial transient risk, and the intrinsic risk, as an increase in any of these parameters increases the costs of risk sharing between the principal and the agent. The effects of risk aversion and intrinsic and transient risk on the principal's investment path are, however, more subtle due to the presence of optimism. If the agent is moderately optimistic, the costs of risk sharing outweigh the benefits of the agent's optimism. The principal's equilibrium investment path, therefore, declines pointwise with the agent's risk aversion and the project's intrinsic and transient risks in this region. If the agent is exuberant, an increase in risk increases the costs of risk sharing. Because the agent's pay-performance sensitivity is greater than one in this region, however, it follows from the static properties of the contract (see Sections 4.1 and 1.6) that the principal optimally increases her investment. In later periods, the degree of agent optimism falls below the price of risk so that the agent's pay-performance sensitivity is less than one. It follows from the static properties of the contract that the principal's investment declines. The first two rows of Table 1 summarize the effects of the price of risk on the agent's pay-performance sensitivity and the principal's investment paths.
Theorem 4.2 (The effects of risk). The effects of risk on the contractual dynamics are as follows.
The results of Theorem 4.2 extend the results of traditional "real options" analyses of the effects of risk on investment (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . Theorem 4.2 shows the effects of the interplay between optimism and agency conflicts, which are not considered in traditional real options models, on the relation between risk and investment. In particular, the relation between risk and investment could be positive or negative depending on the degree of agent optimism.
By the intuition above, the effects of agent optimism, 0 , on the agent's pay-performance sensitivities and the principal's investments are opposite to those of the price of risk. The last two rows of Table 1 summarize the effects of agent optimism. 
Project duration
The optimal termination time of the contract is characterized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.4 (Optimal termination policy). There exist μ
* i , 0 ≤ i ≤ T − 1, such
that the principal terminates the project at date i if and only if μ
The V * i may be thought of as performance targets the firm must reach at each date or else it will terminate the project. Thus, either the μ * i or the V * i may be used to define the trigger policy; the performance targets are more commonly used in practice.
The following result describes the effect of the agent's initial assessment of core output, his risk aversion, and his cost of effort on the duration of the project. As discussed earlier, an increase in the agent's initial degree of optimism about core output increases the rents that the principal is able to extract by exploiting the agent's optimism, thereby increasing her expected continuation value in every period. Hence, it is optimal for the principal to prolong the project's duration. An increase in the agent's risk aversion or cost of effort, however, increases the costs of risk sharing for the principal, thereby lowering her continuation value in every period. Hence, the principal terminates the project earlier.
An Application to Firm R&D
As an illustrative application of the model, we adapt it to investigate the effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts on firm R&D. In this application, the "principal" represents the shareholders of a firm, while the "agent" is the R&D manager who controls the execution of R&D projects. Our application of the model to study firm R&D permits a quantitative investigation of the effects of optimism and agency conflicts on the characteristics of R&D projects-the value they generate, the time paths of investments in R&D, and the structure of optimal dynamic incentive contracts for R&D managers. Our numerical analysis also leads to additional testable implications of the model, specifically the effects of intrinsic risk, transient risk, and optimism on project values and durations.
Numerical implementation and calibration
We describe the numerical implementation of the model in Appendix B. In our numerical implementation, we incorporate a nonzero discount rate, r , for the principal and the agent. Since the principal is risk neutral, r is the risk-free rate, which we set to 4% in our analysis. We assume a competitive market for capital provision by shareholders so that the manager captures the surplus from the project. The initial promised payoff, P 0 , of the manager is, therefore, determined by the condition that shareholders earn competitive returns on their investments (see Appendix B).
We determine the baseline parameter values by calibrating the model to data on the distributions of investments and returns for a sample of pharmaceutical R&D projects reported by Grabowski et al. (2002) . They examine time-series data on the investments and cash flows associated with 118 new chemical entities (NCEs) introduced by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry between 1990 and 1994. For each NCE project, they estimate the project value (net present value [NPV] of future cash flows) at the terminal date of the R&D process. R&D investment expenditures for each NCE project occur prior to the terminal date. They thereby obtain a distribution of project values at the terminal date of the R&D process. Hereafter, we refer to the project value at the terminal date as the "project terminal value." They also report the mean project terminal value (see row 2, column 2, of Table 2 ) as well as the mean project terminal value Table 2 Observed and predicted statistics terminal value; 117/118 denotes the mean project terminal value for the remaining 117 projects after the top project is deleted from the sample; and %>Cost denotes the proportion of the projects whose terminal values exceeded the mean R&D expenditure across projects in the sample.
in each decile of the distribution of project terminal values in their sample (see row 2, columns 3-12, of Table 2 ). In line with Grabowski et al. (2002) , we assume a planning horizon of T = 12 periods and set the length of each period to one year. The loss function l t in Equation (19) is assumed to have the functional form l i = l 1 i l 2 . We calibrate the true mean, μ true 0 , of the core output distribution in addition to the principal's, μ Pr 0 , and agent's, μ Ag 0 , assessments. In particular, we do not assume that the agent is optimistic a priori so that μ Ag 0 could be greater than or less than μ Pr 0 . The true mean of the core output distribution affects the distribution of observed returns of R&D projects to which we calibrate the model. The calibration of the model therefore provides information on the absolute levels of optimism (or pessimism) of investors (the principal) in R&D projects and their managers (the agent).
The thirteen calibrated parameters of the model are grouped into "technology," "preference," and "belief" categories (see Table 3 ). As explained in Appendix A, all observable economic variables depend only on the ratio γ β . Hence, only the ratio γ β (and not the parameters β and γ separately) is identified by the data.
We use the simulated method of moments to estimate the baseline parameters (see Adda and Cooper 2003) . For a candidate vector of parameter values, we simulate forty thousand sample paths and compute the predicted values of the statistics reported by Grabowski et al. (2002) . The baseline values of the parameters are those that minimize the distance between the observed values of the statistics. The observed and predicted values of the statistics are shown in the second and third rows of Table 2 . The baseline values of the parameters are shown in Table 3 . Because we do not have access to the actual data used by Grabowski et al. (2002) , we use parametric bootstrapping to determine the standard errors of the parameter estimates and the statistics (see Davison and Hinkley 1997 and Appendix C) . The standard errors of the predicted statistics are shown in the fourth row of Table 2 . The model is able to match the observed statistics reasonably well. Consistent with the fact that R&D is risky and uncertain, the baseline values of the intrinsic risk, s, and transient risk, σ 0 , are high (relative to μ true 0 ). We define the
to be the expectation (under the true beliefs) at date 0 of the present value of the termination payoff less the present value of the investments made until termination. The initial seed capital, V 0 = $192.3 million, could be interpreted as the project's book value at date zero. The estimated values of the mean assessments of core output by the principal and the agent are $12.5 million and $77.8 million per year, respectively. The true mean of the core output Table 3 Baseline parameter values distribution is $24.4 million per year. In the actual scenario in which the principal's beliefs, the agent's beliefs, and the true core output differ from each other, the project value is $343.9 million. In the hypothetical scenarios in which the true distribution of core output coincides with the principal's and agent's beliefs, the project values are $316.2 million and $489.0 million, respectively. The model calibration, therefore, suggests that on average, managers (the agent) not only are optimistic relative to investors, but are also significantly optimistic relative to the true distribution of core output. (Recall that we did not assume that managers are more optimistic a priori.) Investors know that they are pessimistic relative to managers but do not know that they are pessimistic with respect to the true distribution of core output. The significant relative optimism of R&D managers implies that they can be provided with powerful incentives. The increased output generated by managers' optimism more than offsets investors' relative pessimism, which illustrates the potentially significant beneficial effects of optimism.
Numerical analysis
We compare the actual scenario with two benchmark scenarios: (i) the no agency scenario in which beliefs are symmetric and the agent is risk neutral; and (ii) the symmetric beliefs scenario in which beliefs are symmetric, but the agent is risk averse. We compute the following variables in each scenario: The project NPV or surplus equals the project value as defined in Equation (38) less the initial seed capital, V 0 . In computing the above quantities in the actual and benchmark scenarios, the termination payoff process evolves as in Equation (19) with the contractual parameters (a * , b * , c * ), the agent's effort η * , and the performance targets V * , set to their equilibrium values for the particular scenario (no agency, symmetric beliefs, or actual) being analyzed. Note that the expectations in Equations (39)- (41) are with respect to the true distribution of project quality.
Baseline analysis. Table 4 records the three economic variables, the average project duration, the pay-performance sensitivities (the b * i ), and the principal's investments (the c * i ) in the first four periods for each of the three scenarios when the parameters take their baseline values. The agency costs are substantial. In the actual scenario, the project surplus and the agent's payoff are lower than their values in the benchmark "no agency" scenario by, respectively, $13.4 million and $23.1 million. Further, R&D expenditures decline by $26.9 million. The difference between the values of the project surplus, the agent's payoff, and The table displays the baseline outputs obtained for each of the three agency scenarios when the parameters take their baseline values. These include the Project Surplus, Agent Payoff, and the R&D expenditures, Equations (39)- (41), as well as the pay-performance sensitivities and the principal's investment in the first four periods.
R&D expenditures in the no agency and symmetric scenarios (the agency costs of risk sharing) are $20.3 million, $33.1 million, and $42.0 million, respectively. We see that the agent's optimism significantly mitigates the agency costs of risk sharing.
The effects of transient risk and intrinsic risk. (21) and (22), the variance of the evolution of μ i at date i is
which increases monotonically with the initial transient risk σ 0 . Ceteris paribus, an increase in the transient risk σ 0 implies that the intermediate signals about core output are relatively more informative (the "signal to noise" ratio is high). Hence, the updated assessments of core output are more responsive to signals. Because the variance of the evolution of the principal's assessment of the project's quality increases with transient risk, the principal's future "option value" of continuing the relationship increases. The positive effect of transient risk on the option value of continuation dominates its negative effects on the costs of risk sharing. Hence, the project surplus, the agent's payoff, R&D expenditures, and project duration increase with transient risk. Figure 4 (b) displays the variations of project surplus, the agent's payoff, R&D expenditures, and project duration with the intrinsic risk, s. From Equation (42), the variance of the evolution of the assessment of core output decreases with intrinsic risk above a threshold. Hence, the option value of continuing the relationship in any period also declines. An increase in the intrinsic risk also increases the costs of risk sharing. Hence, all four economic variables decline with intrinsic risk.
The results of Figure 4 
Conclusions
We develop a dynamic structural model to examine the effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts on dynamic principal-agent relationships. Our model differs from previous models by incorporating three key features in a unified framework: (i) asymmetric beliefs and risk attitudes; (ii) dynamic actions by both parties; and (iii) endogenous termination. The optimal contracts predicted by our analysis have novel features that reflect the intertemporal tradeoff between the beneficial effects of the agent's optimism and the detrimental effects of the costs of risk sharing.
Optimism could significantly mitigate the agency costs of risk sharing and enhance project values, which potentially explains why venture capitalists and entrepreneurs continue to engage in projects with high failure rates. The optimal contracts predicted by our analysis have many features in common with observed contracts in environments such as VC and R&D. Our unified framework also leads to potentially testable implications that link underlying project characteristics to the principal's investments, the agent's compensation, and the project's duration.
Finally, we provide quantitative guidance on the effects of asymmetric beliefs by calibrating our structural model to data on pharmaceutical R&D projects. Our analysis shows that managerial optimism could be a significant driver of R&D project values. Permanent and transitory components of a project's risk have contrasting effects on its value and duration.
The remaining results will be proved for the general (dynamic) setting. The ratio of the degree of the agent's optimism, i , to the price of risk, p i = λ(s 2 + σ 2 i ), in period i may be expressed as
Note that the right-hand side of Equation (A4) is strictly less than 0 / p 0 , which by Assumption 1 is less than b M . For our subsequent analysis, it is convenient to use Equation (A4) to express the derivative of the principal's periodic flow function F i (·) as
Proof of Proposition 1.2. We must show that 
, its derivative (A5) vanishes, and
Since F i ( · , 2 i ) is strictly concave, its derivative can only be positive at values below the unique maximizer b( 2 i ), which proves that b( 1 i ) < b( 2 i ), as required. As to the second statement of part (i), note that since c (1) = 1 by Proposition 1.1(i), the derivative of
Consequently, i is less than, equal to, or greater than p i if and only if F i (1, i ) is less than, equal to, or greater than zero. Since F i is strictly concave, F i (1, i ) is less than, equal to, or greater than zero if and only if b( i ) is less than, equal to, or greater than zero, which establishes the result.
Part (ii) directly follows from part (i) and the fact that the optimal investment function is strictly increasing on [0, 1] and is strictly decreasing on [1, γ/β], as described in Proposition 1.1. Part (iii) is a direct consequence of parts (i) and (ii) and the functional form for the optimal effort function given in Equation (31) (22) and (21), respectively, with the index i set to T − 1. For subsequent convenience, we use the index i to denote the date, which is set to T − 1 for now, but later denotes an arbitrary date when we establish the inductive step in our analysis.
The Optimal Contractual Parameters in Period
(recall that i = T − 1), the principal's investment is c i and the agent's contractual parameters are (a i , b i ); see Equation (28) . Following the arguments in Section 1.3, the contract is incentive compatible for the agent if and only if the effortη specified by the contract minimizes the agent's current utility ratio
which implies that the agent's optimal effort is
The promise-keeping constraint must be satisfied by the principal's investment c i and the agent's contractual parameters (a i , b i ); that is, the agent's continuation utility ratio must equal one:
See the discussion following Equation (26). After some algebra, Equation (A9) implies that the relation between the parameters a i , b i , and
Given the contractual parameters (b i , c i ), the principal's additional value from continuing the project or her continuation value at date i, CV i , is
Substituting the agent's effort (A8) into Equation (A11) and using the fact that
the principal's continuation value simplifies to
In Equation (A12), i and p i are, of course, the degree of agent optimism and the price of risk in period [i, i + 1], and φ(·) is defined as in Equation (14). The principal's capital investment and the agent's pay-performance sensitivity maximize the principal's continuation value (A12). By exactly the same arguments as in Section 1.3, the principal's optimal investment as a function of the agent's pay-performance sensitivity is given by Equation (15). The principal's continuation value as a function of the pay-performance sensitivity is therefore
(The constant K in Equation (A13) is identical to the constant K in the static model.) We conclude that the principal chooses the agent's pay-performance sensitivity in period [i, i + 1] to solve
where, of course, F i (·) is the principal's periodic flow function at date i. The optimal termination time is i = T − 1 if the principal's maximum continuation value i (b * i , c(b * i )) is negative.
The Inductive
Step. We now set i = T − 2, and suppose the project has not been terminated as of date T − 2. If the investment is c i , the agent's contractual parameters are (a i , b i ), and he exerts effortη, his continuation utility ratio (26) is
The first line of Equation (A15) follows by the law of iterated expectations and the second line follows by Equation (A9). Since the expression (A15) is identical to Equation (A7), we may use our previous arguments to show that the agent's effort is η(b, c) given in Equation (A8) and the "fixed" component of the agent's compensation is a(b, c) given in Equation (A10). It remains to determine the principal's investment and the agent's pay-performance sensitivity. The principal's continuation value at the beginning of period [i, i + 1] is
The above follows from the fact that the expression
is identical to Equation (A11) and hence Equation (A12). As the second term of Equation (A17) is unaffected by the actions taken by the principal and agent during period [i, i + 1], we may use our previous arguments to show that the principal's continuation value at date i is maximized when the pay-performance sensitivity solves Equation (A14) and the investment is given by c(b * i ). The optimal termination time of the relationship is i if the principal's continuation value CV i is negative.
The incremental change in the termination payoff (19) depends on η only through the terms η β , η γ . There is no loss of generality if the unit of effort is redefined as z := η β , the production function is taken as c α z, and the disutility of effort is taken as z γ/β . The equilibrium, as characterized in Theorem 3.1, depends on the parameters β and γ only through their ratio γ/β. Hence, we normalize β to 1 in the subsequent proofs to simplify the notation.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We begin by proving the claims concerning the path of the payperformance sensitivities b * i s. From Equation (36) and the definition of b 
Since F(·) is strictly quasi-concave, it follows from
is strictly quasi-concave. Thus, the b * i decrease monotonically toward b * p . We now turn our attention to the principal's investments. Suppose first that 0 < λσ 2 0 b * p . In this case the b * i increase monotonically toward b * p , which is less than one. Since c(·) is strictly quasi-concave with a maximum at one (see Proposition 1.1), the c * i increase monotonically toward c * p . The second case is obvious. As for the third case, the ratio
in Equation (A5) is greater than, equal to, or less than one depending on whether i is less than, equal to, or greater than i * . Since c (·) is negative on (1, γ) and positive on (0, 1), it now follows easily from Equation (A5) that b * i > 1 when i < i * ; b * i = 1 when i = i * ; and b * i < 1 when i > i * . Since the b * i decrease monotonically toward b * p , initially the c * i increase until i = i * , and then decrease monotonically toward c * p , as claimed. The results for the agent's effort choices, η * i , is an immediate consequence of the optimal effort function (A8) and the results for the pay-performance sensitivity and investment paths.
For each parameter " " we let b i (π) and c i (π) denote, respectively, the value of b and c at date i when the parameter 's value equals π, and we let b(π) and c(π) denote the entire time path of pay-performance sensitivity and optimal investment when the parameter 's value equals π. We will also write F i (b, π) to make explicit the functional dependence of the derivative of F i on the parameter value π. To ease notational burdens in what follows, we will view the time index i as a real variable.
The following lemma is used repeatedly in the proofs to follow. We now make explicit the functional dependence of the principal continuation value (A17) on the current assessment of the project's core output, and write it as CV i (μ i ). We drop the superscript on μ i , since it will always refer to the principal's assessment. Let Z denote the standard normal random variable. By Equations (20) and (22), the continuation value may be expressed as
whereσ 2 i+1 is defined in Equation (42).
Lemma 6.2. The continuation value CV j (·) is a continuous, nondecreasing function of μ j for 0 ≤ j ≤ T − 1.
Proof. We use backward induction. To establish continuity, we show that there exist positive constants κ 1 j , κ 2 j such that
The assertions of continuity, monotonicity, and Equation (A24) immediately follow when j = T − 1, since CV T −1 (μ T −1 ) = F * T −1 + μ T −1 − l T −1 . Suppose the assertions are true for j = i + 1, . . . , T − 1. We will establish the assertions are true for j = i.
The monotonicity of CV i (·) is a direct consequence of the fact that the expectation on the right-hand side of Equation (A23) is taken with respect to the standard normal density, which is independent of the problem parameters, and the monotonicity of CV i+1 (·) (by the inductive assumption).
The proof of continuity will follow from Equation (A23) if the limit and expectation operators may be interchanged, since CV i+1 (·) is continuous in μ i by the inductive assumption. By the inductive assumption (A24), the function CV i (·) is bounded above by a positive function whose expectation
is finite, and thus the interchange is justified by the dominated convergence theorem. Furthermore, the inequality (A25) shows that the expectation on the right-hand side of Equation (A23) is bounded above by
Hence, it is possible to define κ 1 i , κ 2 i > 0 such that Equation (A24) holds for j = i, as required.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. By Lemma 6.2 each function CV i (·) is continuous and nondecreasing.
The proof of Lemma 6.2, in particular Equation (A26), shows that each CV i (·) is negative for sufficiently small μ i . Since each CV i (·) is obviously positive for sufficiently high μ i , there exists a unique value μ * i for which CV i (μ * i ) = 0. By the dynamic programming principle of optimality, the contract is terminated at date i only if μ i < μ * i .
Proof of Proposition 4.5. The function F i (·) is an increasing function of 0 , which implies that F * i is also an increasing function of 0 . One may proceed exactly as in the proof of Lemma 6.2 to establish that each CV i (·) is a pointwise nondecreasing function of 0 , too, and it should be clear from the proof of Proposition 4.4 that the trigger values will decrease. Since a change in this parameter has no effect on the sample paths, the result (i) follows. The proof of (ii) is the same, except that each F i (·) is now a decreasing function of either λ or k, and thus the trigger values increase.
Appendix B: Numerical Implementation and Calibration
We use the simulated method of moments to calibrate the thirteen parameters,
of the model. For a given candidate parameter vector π, we simulate a sufficiently large number N = 40,000 of sample paths for the termination payoff process described in Equation (19). Each sample path represents a realization of the termination payoff, agent payoff, and capital investments associated with one possible pharmaceutical R&D project. The set of sample paths P is used to construct accurate empirical distributions for the project terminal value and R&D expenditures from which the vector V (π) of simulated values of the fourteen statistics reported in Table 2 
We use the Nelder-Meade optimization subroutine available in MATLAB to obtain the vector π * of parameter estimates that solves
In Equation (B1), we take to be a diagonal matrix whose respective entries are the reciprocals of the corresponding observed statistics reported in Table 2 . We now precisely describe how we determine the vector V (π) of simulated values of the fourteen statistics.
Monte Carlo simulation of the termination payoff process. The incremental termination payoff described in Equation (19) is used to determine a sample path of project termination values and capital investments, as follows. The maximum project duration is set to T = 12 years and the period length is set to one year. In Equation (19), the value for the operating cost i = l 1 i l 2 is directly obtained from the loss parameter components of π. As a result of Theorem 3.1, assuming the project has not been terminated, the equilibrium value for the discretionary output (c * i , η * i ) in Equation (19) is deterministic and, therefore, can be precomputed. The value of θ is drawn from a normal distribution with mean μ true 0 and standard deviation σ 0 . The value of S i+1 is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation s. LetŜ := (Ŝ 1 ,Ŝ 2 , . . . ,Ŝ T ) denote a vector of independent random draws from a standard normal distribution, and letθ denote a random draw from a standard normal distribution independent of theŜ i . If the project has not been terminated as of date i, then the terminal project value at date i + 1 is given by
Determination of the vector of simulated statistics. Once P 0 has been determined, the project termination value and capital investments can now be determined for each sample path (B3) using the true distribution for core output. The same fixed set of sample paths P is used again to determine the vector of simulated statistics V (π) from which the vector of differences d(π) used in Equation (B1) is determined.
Appendix C: Parametric Bootstrapping
We use parametric bootstrapping to determine the confidence intervals for the estimated parameters and the standard deviations of the fourteen predicted statistics (see Davison and Hinkley 1997) . First, we use the parameter vector π = π * and the value for P 0 obtained from the parameter estimation procedure described in Appendix B to generate M samples of 120 projects denoted as (S 1 , . . . , S M ). We use 120 instead of 118, the number of NCE projects in the sample, so that there will be 12 NCEs in each decile of the terminal project value distribution. We use samples S j to compute the jth vector of the fourteen statistics reported in Table 2 . In this manner, we obtain a set of M vectors of "bootstrapped" statistics V j , j = 1, 2, . . . , M. Next, we replace the vector O of actual values of the fourteen statistics of Phase I with the vector V j of bootstrapped values. For each bootstrapped vector V j , we solve Equation (B2) to obtain a set of M "bootstrapped" estimates of the parameter vector (π * 1 , . . . , π * M ). We use these vectors to obtain standard errors for the estimated parameters π * . Since this calculation is computationally intensive, we set M = 1,000 for this calculation.
To determine the standard deviations of the fourteen predicted statistics, we once again use the parameter vector π = π * and the value for P 0 to generate M samples (S 1 , . . . , S M ) of 120 projects. These vectors are used in the obvious way to determine the standard deviations associated with the fourteen predicted statistics that are reported in the fourth row of Table 2 . Since this calculation does not involve optimization, it is not computationally intensive, and so we set M = 10,000.
